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Prescription Drugs and Strict Liability:
The Flaw in The Ointment
California courts have led the nation in the development of strict
products liability.1 Imposing liability based on defect rather than
fault, these modern judicial decisions attempt to protect consumers
rendered vulnerable by an industrial society. 2 As the basis of liability
has shifted so has the focus of the judicial inquiry. In a negligence
action, which ties liability to fault, the jury focuses on the reasona-
bleness of a manufacturer's conduct. 3 In a strict product liability
action, which ties liability to defect, the jury focuses on the condition
of the product.4 Under the doctrine of strict products liability, a
manufacturer is liable if the product is defective as manufactured, if
the product is defective as designed or if the product lacks an
adequate warning.5 A manufacturing defect results from an error in
the production process. 6 A design defect is endemic to an entire line
of products. 7 A warning defect occurs when the product poses
sufficient risks to the user without a suitable warning that the product
becomes defective simply because the product lacks a warning.8 If a
1. Kearl v. Lederle Laboratories, 172 Cal. App. 3d 812, 821, 218 Cal. Rptr. 453, 458
(1985). See also Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal.
Rptr. 697 (1962). See Prosser, The Assault on the Citadel, Strict Liability to the Consumer,
69 YALE L.J. 1099 (1960) (discussing the early development of strict products liability).
2. Barker v. Lull Eng'g. Co., 20 Cal. 3d 413, 435, 573 P.2d 443, 457, 143 Cal. Rptr.
225, 239 (1978) (quoting Keeton, Product Liability and the Meaning of Defect, 5 ST. MARY'S
L.J. 30, 33 (1973)).
3. Kearl, 172 Cal. App. 3d at 822, 218 Cal. Rptr. at 458. See also Feldman v. Lederle
Laboratories, 97 N.J. 429, 479 A. 2d 374, 385 (N.J. 1984).
4. Barker, 20 Cal. 3d at 418, 573 P.2d at 447, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 229. In Barker the
court stated: "[I]n a product liability action, the trier of fact must focus on the product, not
on the manufacturer's conduct. The plaintiff need not prove that the manufacturer acted
unreasonably or negligently in order to prevail in such an action." Id.
5. Cavers v. Cushman Motors, 95 Cal. App. 3d, 338, 343, 157 Cal. Rptr. 142, 145
(1979).
6. Barker, 20 Cal. 3d at 429, 573 P.2d at 454, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 236.
7. Id.
8. Cavers, 20 Cal. 3d at 347, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 147. See also Finn v. G.D. Searle &
Co., 35 Cal. 3d 691, 700, 677 P.2d 1147, 1152, 200 Cal. Rptr. 870, 875 (1979).
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defect exists, the manufacturer is liable even though the manufacturer
has not been found negligent. Strict liability seeks to reduce consumer
injuries caused by defective products.9
In considering prescription drugs, however, courts have been willing
to sacrifice consumer protection. California appellate courts, for
reasons of public policy, have often exempted prescription drugs
from strict liability for design or warning defects.' 0 Believing that
prescription drugs are qualitatively different from other products,
these courts have held pharmaceutical manufacturers strictly liable
for only manufacturing defects." Although recognizing the harm that
drug side effects can cause, these courts have feared the consequences
of applying strict liability to important life saving drugs.' 2 While the
California Supreme Court has never directly addressed the question
whether prescription drugs are subject to strict liability for design or
warning defects,' 3 several appellate courts have recently decided cases
involving prescription drugs.14 These courts, however, have reached
differing conclusions concerning the applicability of strict liability
principles to prescription drugs Y
The purpose of this comment is to evaluate the application of
strict liability in California to prescription drugs. The development
of strict liability in California will be briefly discussed.16 This com-
9. Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 60, 377 P.2d 897, 901, 27
Cal. Rptr. 697, 700 (1962).
10. Brown v. Superior Court, 182 Cal. App. 3d 1125, 1135, 227 Cal. Rptr. 768, 774
(1986) review granted Sept. 18, 1986. See, e.g., McCreery v. Eli Lilly & Co. 87 Cal. App. 3d
77, 86-7, 150 Cal. Rptr. 730, 736 (1978), Carmichael v. Reitz 17 Cal. App. 3d 958, 987-89,
95 Cal. Rptr. 381, 400 (1971), Toole v. Richardson-Merrell Inc. 251 Cal. App. 2d 689, 708-
11, 60 Cal. Rptr. 398, 412 (1967), But see Finn v. G.D.Searle, 35 Cal. 3d 691, 720, 677 P.
2d 1147, 1166, 200 Cal. Rptr. 870, 889 (1984) (dis. opn. of Bird, C.J.). See infra notes 59-78
and accompanying text for a discussion of the policy reasons.
11. Kearl v. Lederle Laboratories, 172 Cal. App. 3d 812, 829, 218 Cal. Rptr. 453, 463
(1985).
12. Id. at 824, 218 Cal. Rptr. at 460.
13. See Finn v. G.D. Searle & Co., 35 Cal. 3d 691, 698, 677 P.2d 1147, 1151, 200 Cal.
Rptr. 870, 874 (1984) (expressly avoiding the issue).
14. See Kearl, 172 Cal. App. 3d 812, 218 Cal. Rptr. 453 (1985), Brown v. Superior Court,
182 Cal. App. 3d 1125, 227 Cal. Rptr. 768 (1986); Flood v. Wyeth Laboratories, Inc., 183
Cal. App. 3d 1272, 228 Cal. Rptr. 700 (1986); Collins v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 186
Cal. App. 3d 1194, 231 Cal. Rptr. 396 (1986), review granted, Feb 26, 1987.
15. See Kearl, 172 Cal. App. 3d 812, 829, 218 Cal. Rptr. 453, 463, (the decision to
exempt prescription drugs from strict liability should be made on a case by case basis); Brown,
82 Cal. App. 3d 1125, 1137, n.4, 227 Cal. Rptr. 768, 775, n.4 (Restatement 402A comment
k immunizes prescription drugs from strict liability); Flood, 183 Cal. App. 3d 1272, 1276, 228
Cal. Rptr. 700, 702 (manufacturers of vaccines are subject to strict liability for design defect);
Collins, 186 Cal. App. 3d 1194, 1210, 231 Cal. Rptr. 396, 406 (when approved by the FDA
and accompanied by a proper warning prescription drugs are exempt from strict liability for
design defect).
16. See infra notes 19-55 and accompanying text.
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ment will then analyze several appellate court decisions concerning
prescription drugs and discuss the policies underlying those deci-
sions.! 7 Finally, this comment will propose that strict liability be
applied to prescription drugs.'
8
EVOLUTION OF STRICT PRODUCTS LIABILITY IN CALIFORNIA
California pioneered the development and subsequent expansion
of the theory that manufacturers are strictly liable in tort for injuries
to persons caused by defects in their products. 9 Strict product liability
first appeared in California in Justice Traynor's concurrence in Escola
v. Coca Cola Bottling Co.20 Justice Traynor stated that a manufac-
turer should incur absolute liability when a product that the manu-
facturer has placed on the market, knowing that the product is to
be used without inspection, proves to have a defect that causes
injury. 2
1
Justice Traynor's theory became law in Greenman v. Yuba Power
Products, Inc. in which the Supreme Court established strict liability
as California law.2 The court stated that the purpose of strict liability
is to insure that the costs of injuries resulting from defective products
are borne by manufacturers who put products on the market rather
than by injured persons who are unable to protect themselves. 4 The
trend to strict liability was subsequently reflected in the Restatement
of Torts, Second.
Section 402A of Restatement 2d provides that one is strictly liable
in tort for selling any product in an unreasonably dangerous defective
condition.25 In Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp. ,26 however, the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court rejected the section 402A requirement that a
product be both defective and unreasonably dangerous. 27 The court
stated that the unreasonably dangerous requirement is an element of
17. For the purposes of this comment both vaccines and prescription drugs will be
considered prescription drugs since neither can be administered except under the auspices of a
physician or a clinic. See infra notes 59-169 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 198-214 and accompanying text.
19. Fluor Corp. v. Jepperson, 170 Cal. App. 3d 468, 474, 216 Cal. Rptr. 68, 71 (1986).
20. 24 Cal. 2d 453, 150 P. 2d 436 (1944).
21. Id. at 461, 150 P.2d at 440.
22. 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963).
23. Id. at 63, 377 P.2d at 901, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 700 (the liability is not governed by the
law of contract warranties but by the law of strict liability in tort).
24. Id.
25. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) oF TORTS § 402A (1965).
26. 8 Cal. 3d 121, 501 P.2d 1153, 104 Cal. Rptr. 433 (1972).
27. Id. at 133, 501 P.2d at 1162, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 442.
Pacific Law Journal / Vol. 19
negligence that is unnecessary in a strict liability action.28 Since one
goal in developing the theory of strict liability was to relieve plaintiffs
from the problems of proof inherent in pursuing negligence and
warranty remedies, 29 the court held that in both manufacturing and
design defect cases a plaintiff need only prove the existence of a
defect in a product and prove that the defect proximately caused his
injury.30 However the court acknowledged the difficulty in giving
meaning to the defectiveness standard.
31
A. Design Defects
In Barker v. Lull Engineering Company,32 the California Supreme
Court defined design defect. 33 The court in Barker held that a product
can be defective in design in two alternative ways. First, the product
is defective when it fails to perform as safely as an ordinary consumer
would expect when used in an intended or reasonably forseeable
manner. 34 Second, the product is defective in design if in light of
certain relevant factors35 the benefits of the challenged design do not
outweigh the risk of danger inherent in the design. 36 The product
itself is the focus of attention rather than the reasonableness of the
manufacturer's conduct. 37 The Barker court emphasized that a plain-
tiff proceeding under the risk benefit standard need establish only a
prima facie showing of causation. 38 Once the plaintiff has made this
showing, the defendant must prove that the product is not defective





31. Id. at 134, 501 P.2d at 1163, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 443 (quoting Traynor, The Ways and
Meanings of Defective Products and Strict Liability, 32 TENN. L. REv. 363, 373 (1965) (No
single definition has proved adequate to define the scope of the manufacturer's strict liability.
The strict liability of the manufacturer is limited, however, to physical injury to person's and
property)).
32. 20 Cal. 3d 413, 573 P.2d 443, 143 Cal.Rptr. 225 (1978).
33. Id. at 432, 573 P. 2d at 455-56, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 237-38.
34. Id.
35. Id. Several factors should be considered in balancing the risks and the benefits of a
product. These factors include the gravity of the danger posed by the challenged design, the
likelihood that such danger would occur, the mechanical feasibility of a safer alternative
design, the financial cost of an improved design, and the adverse consequences to the product
and to the consumer that would result from an alternative design. Id. at 431, 573 P.2d at
455, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 237.
36. Id. at 32, 573 P.2d at 456, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 238.
37. Id. at 432, 573 P.2d at 456, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 238.
38. Id. at 431, 573 P.2d at 455, 143 Cal. Rptr at 237.
39. Id.
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The Barker court identified three significant differences between
strict liability and negligence in a design defect case. First, the strict
liability inquiry focuses dn the product, not the manufacturer's
conduct. 40 Second, under strict liability the fact finder looks at the
defect causing injury in hindsight. 4' Finally, once the plaintiff estab-
lishes causation, the burden shifts to the defendant to prove that the
benefits of the product outweigh the risks.42
The concept of defect has been extended to a great variety of
injury producing deficiencies. These defects range from products that
cause injury because they deviate from the manufacturer's intended
result 4 to products which, though perfectly manufactured, are unsafe
because of a defect in their design or the absence of a safety device.
44
Products may also be defective because they lack adequate warning
or instructions. 45
B. Warning Defects
In California, the failure to warn of dangers inherent in a product
has been considered a category of defect separate from manufacturing
or design defects. 46 Beginning with Canifax v. Hercules Powder Co. ,47
California courts have held that a product although faultlessly made
may nevertheless be defective. 48 The court in Canifax held that a
product is subject to strict liability if it is unreasonably dangerous
to place the product in the hands of a user without a suitable warning
and the product is supplied without a warning.
49
Court of appeal decisions subsequent to Canifax do not clearly
indicate whether in a warning defect case, unlike a design defect
case, a product must be unreasonably dangerous to impose liability.
50
Where the only defect is the lack of an adequate warning, courts
have differed in the standard used for the imposition of strict
liability." Some courts have held that where imposition of liability
40. Id. at 434, 573 P.2d at 457, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 239.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 431, 573 P.2d at 455, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 237.
43. Id. at 428, 573 P.2d at 453, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 235.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Cavers v. Cushman Motors, 95 Cal. App. 3d 336, 343, 157 Cal. Rptr. 142, 145.(1979).
47. 237 Cal. App. 2d 44, 46 Cal. Rptr. 552 (1965).
48. Id. at 53, 46 Cal. Rptr. at 558.
49. Id.
50. Cavers, 95 Cal. App. 3d at 345, 157 Cal. Rptr. 146.
51. Finn v. G.D. Searle & Co., 35 Cal. 3d 691, 699, 677 P.2d 1147, 1151, 200 Cal. Rptr.
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is contingent upon the finding of dangers which were or should have
been known, concepts from negligence law have been amalgamated
into the doctrine of strict liability.52 Another appellate court has held
that rules conditioning liability on knowledge of danger are rules
fixing duties of care53 and that rules expressed in comment j, Res-
tatement 2d of Torts, although applicable to strict liability are well
settled rules of negligence.5 4 Another appellate court applied the
Barker balancing test in determining warning defects.55 Although
strict liability for failure to warn is uniformly recognized by Cali-
fornia appellate courts as a separate product defect, the courts have
applied differing standards in determining defectiveness.
THE APPLICATION OF STRICT LIABILITY TO PRESCRIPTION DRUGS
Strict liability protects the consumer.5 6 Because the manufacturer
is liable for product defects, the manufacturer has an incentive to
make safer products.5 7 The manufacturer can, of course, simply not
870, 874 (1979). The California Supreme Court has never decided whether strict liability should
be imposed for a failure to warn regardless of the defendant's knowledge or ability to know
of the side effect causing injury or whether strict liability should only be imposed based upon
the manufacturer's actual or constructive knowledge. Id.
52. Finn, 35 Cal. 3d at 699, 700 P.2d at 1152, 200 Cal. Rptr. at 875 (citing Carmichael
v. Reitz, 17 Cal. App. 3d 985, 988, 95 Cal. Rptr. 381, 400 (1971); Ortho Pharmaceutical
Corp. v. Chapman, 388 N.E. 2d 541, 550 (1979)).
53. Finn, 35 Cal. 3d at 700, 677 P.2d at 1152, 200 Cal. Rptr. at 875 (citing Oakes v.
E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., Inc., 272 Cal. App. 2d 645, 650 n.4, 77 Cal. Rptr. 709,
713, n.4 (1969); Christofferson v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals, 15 Cal. App. 3d 75, 79-80,
92 Cal. Rptr. 825, 827 (1971)).
54. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 402A comment j provides:
In order to prevent the product from being unreasonably dangerous, the seller may
be required to give directions or warning, on the container, as to its use. The seller
may reasonably assume that those with common allergies, as for example to eggs or
strawberries, will be aware of them, and is not required to warn against them.
Where, however, the product contains an ingredient to which a substantial number
of the population are allergic, and the ingredient is one whose danger is not generally
known, or if known is one which the consumer would reasonably not expect to find
in the product, the seller is required to give warning against it, if the seller has
knowledge, or by the application of reasonable, developed human skill and foresight
should have knowledge, of the presence of the ingredient and the danger. Likewise
in the case of poisonous drugs, or those unduly dangerous for other reasons warning
as to use may be required. Where warning is given, the seller may reasonably assume
that it will be read and heeded; and a product bearing such a warning, which is
safe for use if it is followed, is not in defective condition, nor is it unreasonably
dangerous.
55. Cavers v. Cushman Motors, 95 Cal. App. 3d 336, 348, 157 Cal. Rptr. 142, 148
(1979).
56. Id.
57. Kearl v. Lederle Laboratories, 172 Cal. App. 3d 812, 822, 218 Cal. Rptr. 453, 458
(1985). Sie also Collins v. Eli Lilly Co., 342 N.W.2d 37, 49 (Wis. 1984)(the cost of damage
awards will act as an incentive for drug companies to test adequately the drugs they place on
the market).
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market a product that cannot be made sufficiently safe. Thus, a
trade off may occur. Products may be safer but fewer new products
may be available. 58 Alternatively, the manufacturer may continue to
market the product and pass the costs of liability to all consumers.
The possibility that increased accountability may lead to decreased
product availability has caused some California courts to exempt
prescription drugs from strict liability.59 These courts have reasoned
that holding drug manufacturers strictly liable for drug side effects,
and incidently liable for large damage awards, would deter manu-
facturers from marketing other life saving drugs.A0 A policy of
protecting consumers has collided with a policy of making prescrip-
tion drugs readily available. On the one hand, pharmaceutical man-
ufacturers argue that important new drugs may not be developed
because of the costs of strict liability.61 On the other hand, innocent
consumers injured by unsafe drugs should not be singled out to bear
the costs of society's interest in a ready supply of prescription drugs. 62
Although the California Supreme Court has never indicated that any
class of products is exempt from strict liability, appellate courts have
extended immunity to prescription drugs for both design and warning
defects.
63
A. Design Defect Applied to Prescription Drugs
A design defect is inherent in a line of products.64 Because the
flaw has been designed into the product, every unit in the line is
unsafe. Prescription drugs have been considered unavoidably unsafe
by some courts and exempted from strict liability on the authority
58. Kearl, 172 Cal. App. 3d at 824, 218 Cal. Rptr. at 459-60.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 823, 218 Cal. Rptr. at 459.
61. Defendant's Brief on the Merits at 15, Brown v. Superior Court, 1 Civ. No. A032655
(Calif. Supreme Court Jan. 16, 1987).
62. Petitioner's Brief on the Merits at 27, Brown v. Superior Court, 1 Civ. No. A032655
(Calif. Supreme Court Nov. 3, 1986).
63. Brown v. Superior Court, 182 Cal. App. 3d 1125, 1134, 227 Cal. Rptr. 768, 773
(1986). See also Toole v. Richardson Merrell, Inc., 251 Cal. App. 2d 689, 708-11, 60 Cal.
Rptr. 398, 413 (1967) (manufacturer of Mer/29, a drug prescribed to treat arteriosclerosis, is
strictly liable only for manufacturing or warning defects); Christofferson v. Kaiser Found.
Hosps., 15 Cal. App. 3d 75, 77-80, 92 Cal. Rptr. 825, 827 (1971) (in a prescription drug case
defendant is only liable for warning defects); Carmichael v. Reitz, 17 Cal. App. 3d 958, 988-
89, 95 Cal. Rptr. 381, 400 (1971) (manufacturer of prescription drug that assisted pregnancy
is strictly liable only for manufacturing or warning defect).
64. Barker v. Lull Eng'g. Co., 20 Cal. 3d 413, 427, 573 P.2d 443 , 143 Cal. Rptr. 225,
234 (1978).
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of the Restatement of Torts 402A comment k. 65 Comment k recog-
nizes that although certain products like prescription drugs cannot
be made completely safe, the products have value to society. 66 If an
unavoidably unsafe product is accompanied by a warning, the product
is not defective. Applying comment k, California courts have granted
prescription drugs immunity from strict liability. However, a recent
California decision has suggested that in some cases strict liability
for dangerous defects could be applied to prescription drugs. 67
1. Kearl v. Lederle Laboratories
In Kearl v. Lederle Laboratories" a patient who had received an
oral polio vaccine subsequently contracted the disease and developed
paralysis. The patient brought a products liability action against the
manufacturer of the vaccine arguing that the vaccine was defective
in design and warning.69 The court held that an oral polio vaccine
was an unavoidably dangerous product exempt from strict liability
for design or warning defects. The court stated, however, that the
decision to grant a drug immunity should be made on a case by case
basis.70
In reaching this decision, the court began with the proposition that
strict liability may not be appropriate for products that are extremely
beneficial to society yet pose an inherent and substantial risk that is
65. Brown, 182 Cal. 3d at 1140, 227 Cal. Rptr. at 777.
66. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTs § 402A comment k addresses the problem of
unavoidably unsafe products such as the Pasteur vaccine for rabies. Comment k states:
Since the disease itself invariably leads to a dreadful death, both the marketing and
the use of the vaccine are fully justified, notwithstanding the unavoidably high
degree of risk which they involve. Such a product, properly prepared, and accom-
panied by proper directions and warning, is not defective, nor is it unreasonably
dangerous. The same is true of many other drugs, vaccines and the like, many of
which for this very reason cannot legally be sold except to physicians, or under the
prescription of a physician. It is also true in particular of many new or experimental
drugs as to which, because of lack of time and opportunity for sufficient medical
experience, there can be no assurance of safety, or perhaps even of purity of
ingredients, but such experience as there is justifies the marketing and use of the
drug notwithstanding a medically recognizable risk. The seller of such products,
again with the qualification that they are properly prepared and marketed, and
proper warning is given, where the situation calls for it, is not to be held to strict
liability for unfortunate consequences attending their use, merely because it has
undertaken to supply the public with an apparently useful and desirable product,
attended with a known but apparently reasonable risk.
67. Kearl v. Lederle Laboratories, 172 Cal. App. 3d 812, 829, 218 Cal. Rptr. 453, 463
(1985).
68. Id.
69. Id. at 820, 218 Cal. Rptr. at 456.
70. Id. at 829, 218 Cal. Rptr. at 463.
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unavoidable at the time of distribution.71 Acknowledging that the
extent to which strict liability might inhibit drug availability has been
questioned 7 2 the court believed that the enhanced prospect of liability
might substantially affect availability. 73 The court stated that the
release of a new drug may be delayed or postponed indefinitely.74 In
addition, the cost of insuring against strict liability could place the
cost of research and marketing of new drugs beyond what manufac-
turers, particularly small manufacturers, are willing to risk. 75 Further
insurers might be unwilling to underwrite the increased risks at an
affordable cost.76 Finally the increased cost of drugs might place the
price of drugs outside the reach of those who need them most.77 In
the case of certain drugs, the court stated, availability is more
important than accountability. 78 These drugs should be judged by the
manufacturer's actual or constructive knowledge at the time of
distribution rather than under a strict liability standard.
79
Despite these policy considerations, the court in Kearl refused to
grant blanket immunity to all prescription drugs for design defects.
Uncomfortable with the past mechanical application of comment k,
the Kearl court ruled that in each case a trial court should determine
whether a drug is unavoidably dangerous s0 Only drugs that are found
71. Id. at 825, 218 Cal. Rptr. at 460.
72. See McClellan, Strict Liability for Drug Induced Injuries: An Excursion Through the
Maze of Products Liability, Negligence and Absolute Liability, 25 WAYNE L. REv. 1, 33 (1978)
(the suggestion that strict liability would deprive consumers of essential drugs is subject to
serious doubts. In the absence of substantial data showing that the profit margin in the drug
industry is so low that the industry could not bear the costs of the injuries drugs cause, strict
liability should apply). Comment, An Escape from Strict Liability: Pharmaceutical Manufac-
turers' Responsibility for Drug-Related InjuriesUnder Comment k to Section 402A of the
Restatement (Second) of Torts, 23 DuQ. L. REv. 199, 215-18 (1984) (questioning the extent to
which strict liability would inhibit availability).
73. Kearl, 172 Cal. App. 3d at 823, 218 Cal. Rptr. at 459.
74. Id. See Reed & Watkins, Product Liability Tort Reform: The Case for Federal Action,
63 NEB. L. R v. 839, 848-49 (1984) (the prospect of strict liability may cause manufacturers
to withhold needed vaccines).
75. Kearl, 172 Cal. App. 3d at 824, 218 Cal. Rptr. at 459 (1985). See Note, The Liability
of Pharmaceutical Manufacturers for Unforeseen Adverse Drug Reactions, 48 FoRaHAM L.
Rev. 735, 757-58 (1980) (small manufacturers will not risk the costs of developing new drugs
if strict liability is imposed).
76. Kearl, 172 Cal. App. 3d at 825, 218 Cal. Rptr. at 459. See Baynes, Liability for
Vaccine Related Injuries: Public Health Considerations and Some Reflections on the Swine
Flu Experience, 20 ST. Louis U.L.J. 44, 66 (1977) (the federal government assumed respon-
sibility for injuries resulting from strict liability for swine flu vaccine design defects when
manufacturers were unwilling to underwrite the risks).
77. Kearl, 172 Cal. App. 3d at 824, 218 Cal. Rptr. at 459.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 825, 218 Cal. Rptr. at 460.
80. Id. at 829, 218 Cal. Rptr. at 463. The court found the routine application of comment
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to be unavoidably dangerous should be immune from strict liability. 8'
Cautious about conferring special protection on a product, the
court recommended a pretrial hearing out of the jury's presence to
determine whether a product is unavoidably dangerous. 82 The trial
court should consider three questions in determining that a drug is
unreasonably dangerous and exempt from strict liability analysis.
83
First, the court must determine whether the drug, when distributed,84
was intended to confer an exceptionally important benefit that made
the availability of the product particularly necessary.85 Second, the
court must determine whether the risk posed by the drug at the time
of distribution, was substantial and unavoidable.86 The third question
is whether the interest in product availability as measured at the time
of distribution outweighs the interest in promoting enhanced account-
ability through strict liability design defect review.
8 7
The Kearl test is similar to the Barker risk benefit test in that each
test focuses on the product rather than on the manufacturer's con-
duct.8 Kearl differs from Barker, however, in three ways. First, the
Barker test asks whether the product is defective,89 while Kearl asks
whether the product is unavoidably dangerous.9 Second, in Kearl,
the court determines whether the product is unavoidably dangerous. 9'
k immunity to prescription drugs "tautological." The rule that prescription drugs should be
immune from strict liability is often stated in conclusory fashion accompanied by little more
than a reference to Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A, comment k. See also Comment,
Can a Prescription Drug Be Defectively Designed?-Brochu v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp.,
31 DE PAUL L. REv. 247, 254 (1980) (prescription drugs should not be exempt from strict
liability design defect analysis if an alternative product was available at the time of distribution
that could have accomplished the same purpose).
81. Kearl, 172 Cal. 3d at 829, 218 Cal. Rptr. at 463 (the decision to grant immunity
poses a mixed question of law and fact and can be made only after evidence is heard, out of
the jury's presence, on certain relevant factors).
82. Id.
83. See Wade, On the Effect in Product Liability of Knowledge Unavailable Prior to
Marketing, 58 N.Y.U.LAw.REv. 734, 753-54 (1983) (time of distribution or marketing is when
the manufacturer relinquishes control of the product).
84. Kearl, 172 Cal. 3d at 829, 218 Cal. Rptr. at 464.
85. Id. In determining substantiality, the court should consider whether, at the time of
distribution the risk posed permanent or long term disability as opposed to mere temporary
or insignificant inconvenience. In deciding unavoidability the court should consider whether
the product was designed to minimize the risk inherent in the product and the availability of
any alternative product that would have as effectively accomplished the full intended purpose
of the subject product. Id. at 830, 218 Cal. Rptr. at 464.
86. Id. at 829, 218 Cal. Rptr. at 430.
87. Id.
88. See Barker v. Lull Eng'g. Co., 20 Cal. 3d 413, 432, 573 P.2d 443, 455, 143 Cal.
Rptr. 225, 238 (1978).
89. Id.
90. See Kearl, 172 Cal. App. 3d at 829, 218 Cal. Rptr. at 463.
91. Id.
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In Barker the jury decides whether the product is defective. 92 Third,
Kearl requires an analysis of the risks and benefits at the time of
distribution,93 rather than at the time of trial.94
Under Kearl, therefore, a drug would be judged first by the court
by one standard and then by the jury by a different standard. If a
drug were not found to be unavoidably dangerous, after a Kearl
hearing, the drug would be subject to strict liability. The attempt to
balance the competing policy interests in the Kearl test raises the
possibility that a prescription drug would be subject to strict liability
for design defect. The approach of the Kearl court was subsequently
considered by another appellate court in the same district.
2. Brown v. Superior Court
In Brown v. Superior Court,95the court directly rejected the Kearl
proposal.96 In Brown the plaintiffs in "complex litigation" against
manufacturers of DES, a prescription drug, challenged several pretrial
rulings of the Superior Court. 97 The Court of Appeal held that
manufacturers could not be held strictly liable for injuries allegedly
caused by design or warning defects in the drug.98 The Brown court
found no reason to impose a condition on comment k immunity. 99
The Brown court stated that comment k and Barker were not
completely reconcilable.'00 Comment k suggests design immunity for
all prescription drugs.' 0l Barker does not provide immunity for any
product, but tests every product either under a consumer expectation
or a risk benefit analysis.'0 2 Brown interpreted Kearl as advocating
a variant of the Barker risk benefit analysis to determine whether
92. Barker, 20 Cal. 3d at 434, 573 P.2d at 457, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 239.
93. Kearl, 172 Cal. App. 3d at 830, 218 Cal. Rptr at 464.
94. Barker, 20 Cal. 3d at 430, 573 P.2d 454, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 236.
95. 182 Cal. App. 3d 1125, 227 Cal. Rptr. 768 (1986).
96. Id. at 1137, 227 Cal. Rptr. at 775.
97. Id. at 1129, 227 Cal. Rptr at 769. DES, diethyistilbestrol, is a synthetic estrogen used
to prevent miscarriages and alleged to have caused injury to plaintiffs exposed to the drug in
utero. Some 69 cases have been designated complex litigation and assigned to one judge to
hear all pretrial rulings. Although each action has its own case number and independent
existence, all the law and motion rulings are made in the complex litigation case. These rulings
are binding on the individual cases. Plaintiffs in Brown were petitioning for writ of mandate
and/or prohibition. Id. at 1129, 227 Cal. Rptr. at 770.
98. Id. at 1137, 227 Cal. Rptr. at 774 (the plaintiffs are suing the manufacturers of the
prescription drug, DES, alleging injury to plaintiffs exposed to the drug in utero).
99. Id. at 1140, 227 Cal. Rptr, at 774.
100. Id. at 1140, 227 Cal. Rptr. at 773.
101. Id. at 1137, 227 Cal. Rptr. at 774.
102. Id. at 1137, 227 Cal. Rptr. at 773.
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comment k immunity should be accorded. 0 s The court in Brown
stated that comment k is an implied exception to the design defect
analysis and flatly held that comment k should be followed since
decision law prior to Kearl had uniformly supported comment k
immunity.""4
The Brown court found the Kearl approach to strict liability for
prescription drugs unnecessary, novel and unworkable. 105 The court
suggested that the Kearl approach was flawed in several respects.
First of all, the Kearl mini-trial would require that courts determine
an essentially factual question."' The first two Kearl inquiries raise
only questions of fact. 0 7 The Brown court stated that the jury,
properly instructed about the meaning of the terminology in the
factual questions, could determine the existence of risks and bene-
fits. 108 Moreover, the court in Brown stated that the third question
on which Kearl focuses, whether availabilty is outweighed by ac-
countability,'09 is an open ended policy question that should not be
decided by the court."0 Another flaw in the Kearl approach is that
different courts could reach inconsistent results with regard to the
same drug."' No uniformity can be expected in the treatment of a
particular drug if lower courts are permitted to weigh the pros and
cons of immunity on a case by case basis. 12 The Brown court objected
strenuously to the Kearl requirement that the court rule on factual
questions and weigh and balance evidence central to a plaintiff's
case." 3
While rejecting the Kearl mini-trial the Brown court did not,
however, analyze the reasons for applying comment k. The Brown
court stated in a7 footnote"4 that if the supreme court held comment
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 1135, 227 Cal. Rptr. at 774.
106. Id. at 1136, 227 Cal. Rptr. at 774.
107. Id. at 1134, 227 Cal. Rptr. at 773 (whether the product was intended to confer an
exceptionally important benefit and whether there was a substantial and unavoidable risk posed
by the product). See Kearl v. Lederle Laboratories, 172 Cal. App. 3d at 820, 218 Cal. Rptr.
at 464.
108. Brown, 182 Cal. App. 3d at 1134, 227 Cal. Rptr. at 773.
109. Kearl, 172 Cal. App. 3d at 830, 218 Cal. Rptr. at 464 See also Brown, 182 Cal. App.
3d at 1136, 227 Cal. Rptr. at 775 where the court stated: "What degree of benefit should
outweigh what level of risk? How far must the scales tip in order to provide design immunity
for a particular drug." Id.
110. Brown, 182 Cal. App. 3d at 1136, 227 Cal. Rptr. at 774.
111. Id. at 1136, 227 Cal. Rptr. at 775.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id. (citing Akers v. Kelley Co., 173 Cal. App. 3d 633, 651, 219 Cal. Rptr. 513 (1985)).
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k inapplicable in California, there would be no reason not to apply
the Barker two prong test for design defect. 115
Thus, the Brown court would go further than the Kearl court if
comment k immunity were found not to apply to prescription drugs.
Brown would subject every drug to a Barker strict liability test under
either a consumer expectation or risk/benefit theory. Recently two
other appellate courts have cited the Kearl decision in reaching two
opposite results.
C. Recent Appellate Decisions
In Flood v. Wyeth Laboratories, Inc., 116 a DPT vaccination alleg-
edly caused the plaintiff severe brain damage." 7 The court held that
the statutory scheme that required immunization for school age
children did not extend a grant of immunity to the manufacturer of
the vaccine." 8 The court stated that if the legislature had intended
to grant immunity to drug manufacturers the statute would explicitly
include an exemption provision." 9 The court cited Kearl for the
proposition that manufacturers of vaccine are subject to liability
under the strict products liability design defect theory unless the trial
court finds that the product is unavoidably dangerous.
20
In Collins v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corporation,2' the plaintiff
alleged that she was injured by an IUD.' 22 The court held that a
prescription drug or device, distributed with FDA approval and
The trial court had rejected the Barker test stating that the consumer expectation test did not
fit because DES was not withing the common experience of ordinary consumers. The risk-
benefit test was inappropriate because the weighing process involves consideration of possible
alternative designs, whereas the formula for DES is a scientific constant, and the product
could not be designed differently. Id. at 1134, n.4, 227 Cal. Rptr. at 773, n.4.
115. Brown, 182 Cal. App. 3d at 1136, 227 Cal. Rptr. at 775. The consumer expectation
prong of Barker does not require that the product be within the common experience of the
ordinary consumer. Alternatively, a risk benefit analysis would consider whether other mis-
carriage medicine was available, not the narrow question of whether an alternative formula
for DES could have been used. Id.
116. 183 Cal. App. 3d 1272, 228 Cal. Rptr. 700 (1986).
117. Id. at 1273, 228 Cal. Rptr. at 701. Every child in this state must receive the DPT
vaccine before being admitted into any school. See CAL. HEALTH AND SAxETY CODE §§ 3380-
3390. No person shall be unconditionally admitted "as a pupil of any private or public
elementary or secondary school, child care center, day nursery, nursery school, or development
center, unless prior to his or her first admission to that institution he or she has been fully
immunized against diptheria, pertussis (whooping cough), and tetanus. Id. § 3381. Some
exceptions, not pertinent to this discussion, are permitted. See id. §§ 3385 and 3386.
118. Flood, 183 Cal. App. 3d at 1274, 228 Cal. Rptr. at 702.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 1275, 228 Cal. Rptr. at 703.
121. 186 Cal. App. 3d 1194, 231 Cal. Rptr. 396 (1986), review granted, Feb 26, 1987.
122. Id. at 1206, 231 Cal. Rptr. at 402.
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accompanied by requisite warnings, is unavoidably unsafe as a matter
of law and thus cannot be the basis for a cause of action based on
strict liability for a design defect. 23 The Collins court held that the
FDA tests were similar to both the Barker risk benefit analysis and
the Kearl mini-hearing. 24 In deciding whether the product was de-
fective in design, the Collins court emphasized that the plaintiff was
injured by the precise risk about which the manufacturer had warned.125
The court expressly did not decide whether an action in strict liability
is barred when the plaintiff's injury is caused by a risk not warned
against. 126
The preceding cases demonstrate that appellate courts in California
reach different conslusions on the issue of blanket immunity from
strict liability for design defects for prescription drugs. In addition
to suing on a design defect theory, many plaintiffs sue for injuries
allegedly caused by prescription drugs on a warning defect theory. 27
In a warning defect case, the injured plaintiff does not allege that
the manufacture or design of the product was faulty, but that the
manufacturer failed to warn of potential dangers in the use of its
product.1 28
D. Warning Defect Applied To Prescription Drugs
In California the concept of defect has been expanded to include
products that are dangerous because they lack adequate warning or
instructions.129 The failure to warn of dangers inherent in a product
is a category of defect separate from manufacturing or design de-
fects. 130 The applicability of strict liability for a failure to warn has
been troublesome for the courts in prescription drug cases.
In a strict liability action for manufacturing defect the jury looks
at a product in hindsight and ignores the question of the manufac-
turer's actual or constructive knowledge of the risk.' 31 In a warning
123. Id. at 1199, 231 Cal. Rptr. at 398.
124. Id. at 1208, 231 Cal. Rptr. at 404.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Keari v. Lederle Laboratories, 172 Cal. App. 3d 812, 826, 213 Cal. Rptr 453, 461
(1985).
128. Cavers v. Cushman Motor Sales, Inc., 95 Cal. App. 3d 338, 343, 157 Cal.Rptr. 142,
145 (1979).
129. Id.
130. Campbell v. General Motors, 32 Cal. App. 3d 112, 649 P.2d 224, 228, 184 Cal. Rptr.
891 (1982).
131. Kearl, 172 Cal. App. 3d at 832, 218 Cal. Rptr. at 465.
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defect case courts have been reluctant to hold manufacturers liable
for risks that were unknown and undiscoverable at the time the drug
was distributed. 132 Side effects of a drug may not be known until
long after the time the drug is placed on the market. Consequently
negligence concepts have been incorporated into the strict liability
analysis. 33
The court in Cavers v. Cushman Motors34 offered one solution to
the question of how to apply strict liability to a warning defect.
13
The court stated that a warning defect is difficult to define since the
jury can neither compare the product to similar products nor weigh
alternative designs.1 36 Finding the principles formulated by the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court in Barker helpful in defining defect, the Cavers
court adapted the risk-benefit test to a warning defect. 137 Under the
Cavers test, a jury weighs the degrees of danger inherent in a product
in order to determine if the product requires a warning. 38 While
Cavers was not a prescription drug case, the California Supreme
Court cited the Cavers approach approvingly in Finn v. G. D.
Searle. 139
1. Finn v. G. D. Searle
In Finn, the court considered the applicability in a prescription
drug case of strict liability principles for known or knowable de-
132. See, e.g., Kearl, 172 Cal. App. 3d 812, 218 Cal. Rptr. 453 (1985). Brown v. Superior
Court, 182 Cal. App. 3d 1125, 227 Cal. Rptr. 768 (1986).
133. Finn v. G.D. Searle, 35 Cal. 3d 691, 700, 671 P.2d 1147, 1152. 200 Cal. Rptr. 870,
875 (1984).
134. 95 Cal. App. 3d 336, 157 Cal. Rptr. 142 (1979).
135. Id. at 346, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 147. (There is no precise definition of the term "defect."
The concept of defect is more elusive in a design or warning case than in a manufacturing
case).
136. Id. See also Wade, On the Nature of Strict Tort Liability for Products, 44 Miss. L.J.
825, 832 (1973) (to apply the term defective to a case where a warning is not attached to the
product and to use the term without defining it to the jury is to insure that the they will be
misled).
137. Cavers, 95 Cal. App. 3d at 346, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 147. The court also stated: "the
consumer expectation text may be out of place in a design defect or warning case since the
consumer would not know how safe the product could be made." Id. at 347, 157 Cal. Rptr.
at 148.
138. Id. The trial court may assist the jury's determination by suggesting various factors
to consider. Factors to be considered in determining whether the product is defective because
of the lack of a warning are: the normal expectations of the consumer as to how the product
will perform, degrees of simplicity or complication in the operation or use of the product, the
nature and magnitude of the danger to which the user is exposed, the likelihood of injury,
and the feasibility and beneficial effect of including a warning. Id. at 347, 157 Cal. Rptr. at
148.
139. 35 Cal. 3d 691, 677 P.2d 1147, 200 Cal. Rptr. 870 (1979).
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fects."'4 The plaintiff in Finn was blinded as a side effect of the drug
Diodoquin.' 4' The plaintiff argued that Searle was strictly liable for
failing to warn of the side effects of Diodoquin at the time plaintiff
took the drug.142 The California Supreme Court reviewed the general
approaches to product liability for a warning defect.' 43
The decisions in other jurisdictions have developed two theories.""'
The first theory imposes strict liability for a failure to warn regardless
of defendant's knowledge or ability to know of the side effect causing
injury.14- The second theory focuses on the defendant's actual or
constructive knowledge. 46 The Finn court stated that under the
hindsight theory in which the manufacturer's knowledge is ignored,
there is a substantial distinction between a negligence standard and
strict liability. 47 The Finn court did not choose between these two
positions. 148
The Finn court then discussed the type of warning that a drug
may be required to have. 49 First, the manufacturer may be required
to adequately instruct the consumer as to how the product whould
be used.'50 In this case, a warning may reduce the risk of injury.'5'
A second option is to require a manufacturer to inform the consumer
140. Id. at 698, 677 P.2d at 1151, 200 Cal. Rptr. at 874 (the court did not decide whether
liability for a failure to warn could be imposed for failure of the product to warn of defects
discovered and reasonably discoverable only after the product has caused injury). See also
Wade, On the Effect in Product Liability of Knowledge Unavailable Prior to Marketing, 58
N.Y.U.L. Rv. 734 (1983) (extensive discussion of the time when defect should be determined).
141. Finn, 35 Cal. 3d at 695, 677 P.2d at 1149, 200 Cal. Rptr. at 872 (1984).
142. Id. The trial court deleted the word strictly from the proposed instruction, and the
plaintiff appealed. The California Supreme Court held that no prejudicial error occured because
the instructions did not reflect the theory on which plaintiff argued the case. Id. The Court
did not reach the question whether a manufacturer is liable for defects that are unknowable
at the time of distribution. Id. See Wade, supra note 139, at 749 (a product related danger is
knowable if the available scientific data give rise to a reasonable inference that the danger is
likely to exist).
143. Finn, 35 Cal. 3d at 698, 677 P.2d at 1151, 200 Cal. Rptr. at 874.
144. Id.
145. See, e.g., Woodill v. Parke Davis & Co. 79 Il1.2d 26, 402 N.E.2d 194, 197 (1980);
Bristol-Myers Co. v. Gonzales, 561 S.W.2d 801, 804 (Tex. 1978); Singer v. Sterling Drug, Inc.
461 F.2d 288 (7th Cir. 1972).
146. See, e.g., Leibowitz v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp. 307 A.2d 449, 457-58 (Pa. 1973);
Berkebile v. Brantly Helicopter Corp. 462 Pa. 83, 101, 337 A.2d 893, 902 (1975).
147. Finn, 35 Cal. 3d at 699, 677 P.2d at 1151, 200 Cal. Rptr. at 874. A court makes a
hindsight decision when it determines liability based upon failure to warn of defects discovered
and reasonably discoverable only after the product has caused injury. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 699, 677 P.2d at 1152, 200 Cal. Rptr. at 875.
150. Id. (citing Midgley v. S.S. Kresge Co. 55 Cal. App. 3d 67, 127 Cal. Rptr. 217, (1976)
(strict liability imposed when the manufacturer failed to advise users on the proper use and
assembly of a telescope).
151. Finn, 35 Cal. 3d at 700, 677 P.2d at 1152, 200 Cal. Rptr. at 875.
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or the physician of potential risks or side effects which may follow
the foreseeable use of the product. 152 The second type of warning is
particularly applicable in claims involving prescription drugs, 1 3 since
it affords the consumer an opportunity to make an informed choice. 154
The Finn court suggested that the Cavers balancing test would be
appropriate in determing whether a drug was defective because it
lacked a warning or had an inadequate warning.1l5 A strict liability
test focuses on the product and asks whether the product has been
rendered defective because applying an objective standard and weigh-
ing the relevant costs and benefits a warning was required.156 This
warning would be based on the information the manufacturer had
"in hand.'
15 7
2. Kearl v. Lederle Laboratories
The court in Kearl v. Lederle Laboratories58 rejected the Finn
proposal for a balancing test. 59 The court in Kearl held that an oral
polio vaccine manufacturer's warning adequately informed the patient
of the reasonably forseeable risk associated with the vaccine.1 60 Dis-
missing the Finn discussion of Cavers as dicta, the Kearl court stated
that nothing in Cavers suggested that failure to warn should be
subject to an analysis different from negligence.'16  The court ques-
tioned the proposition that in a product liability case failure to warn
or inadequacy of a warning could be the basis of imposition of strict
liability. 162 In warning cases, according to Kearl, liability is condi-
152. Id. See generally Twerski, The Use and Abuse of Warnings in Products Liability-
Design Defect Litigation comes of Age, 61 CORNELL L. REv. 495, 520-21 (1976) (different
kinds of warnings will be required as a result of the different functions the warnings serve).
153. Finn, 35 Cal. 3d at 700, 677 P.2d at 1152, 200 Cal. Rptr. at 875, See supra note 137
(the Cavers test balances the risks of the product against the benefits to determine whether
the degree of danger in a product is sufficient to require a warning).
154. See McClellan, supra note 72 at 32. Inadequate warning claims protect the interest of
the consumer in personal autonomy as well as safety. An important consumer interest is
violated if a material risk or direction is not disclosed. Id.
155. Finn, 35 Cal. 3d at 700, 677 P. 2d at 1152- 53, 200 Cal. Rptr. at 875-76.
156. Id. Under a negligence standard, the jury focuses on the reasonableness of the
manufacturer's conduct. Under a strict liability standard, the jury focuses on whether the
product has been rendered defective because the required warning was lacking. Id. at 700, 677
P. 2d at 1152, 200 Cal. Rptr. at 875.
157. Id. at 701, 677 P.2d at 1153, 200 Cal. Rptr. at 876.
158. 172 Cal. App. 3d 812, 218 Cal. Rptr. 453 (1985).
159. Kearl, 172 Cal. App. 3d at 832, n.17, 218 Cal. Rptr. at 466, n.17.
160. Id. at 836, 218 Cal. Rptr at 469.
161. Id. at 832, n.17, 218 Cal. Rptr at 466, n.17.
162. Id. at 831-32, 218 Cal. Rptr at 465.
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tioned on the defendant having actually or constructively known of
the risk that triggers the warning.
163
The Kearl court concluded that the adequacy of a warning should
be judged under a reasonableness standard.' 4 The adequacy of the
warning is measured by the reasonably forseeable risks associated
with the product. 65
3. Brown v. Superior Court
Similarly the court in Brown v Superior Court166 held that manu-
facturers of prescription drugs should not be strictly liable for failure
to warn of risks that were not known or reasonably discoverable at
the time of distribution. 67 The court stated that adoption of comment
k immunity for prescription drugs would be a meaningless act without
also embracing comment j to section 402A.161 Comment j states that
a warning is required where the danger is known or should have
been known.1 69 The Brown court held that the policy reasons for
providing design defect immunity for prescription drugs also counsel
against imposing strict liability upon manufacturers for failure to
warn of risks not known or reasonably knowable.170 The court saw
no difference between applying strict liability for design defect and
failure to warn.' 71
Both Kearl and Brown focused on the conduct of the manufacturer
rather than the safety of the product and held that the relevant time
for determining defect was at the time of distribution. 72 Neither
court adopted the Finn suggestion that a test balancing the cost and
benefits of a warning be used.
STRICT LIABILITY FOR PRESCRIPTION DRuGs IN OTHER JURISDICTIONS
Courts and commentators have exhaustively discussed the reasons
for and against granting drugs immunity from strict liability for
163. Id. at 832, 218 Cal. Rptr. at 466. In a strict liability action the court ignores the
question of a manufacturer's actual or constructive knowledge of risk or imputes to the
manufacturer current scientific knowledge of the risk caused by his product. Id.
164. Id. at 833, 218 Cal. Rptr. 466.
165. Id.
166. 182 Cal. App. 3d 1125, 227 Cal. Rptr. 768 (1986).
167. Id. at 1140, 227 Cal. Rptr. at 776.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 1138, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 776.
171. Id. at 1139, 227 Cal. Rptr at 777. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A
comment j supra note 54.
172. Id. at 1139, 227 Cal. Rptr. at 777.
210
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design and warning defects. Life saving drugs are particularly bene-
ficial to society. Yet it is impossible to make risk free drugs.173
Many courts have wrestled with the applicability of strict liability
to prescription drugs. In Feldman v. Lederle Laboratories,17 4 the New
Jersey Supreme Court first considered whether comment k should
immunize prescription drugs from strict liability for design defect. 175
The court held that the principle of strict liability is generally appli-
cable to manufacturers of prescription drugs. 76
In Feldman the court discussed instances in which certain groups
have been exempted from strict liability analysis. Doctors and den-
tists, who render to consumers professional service involving skills
in judgment and diagnosis are exempt from strict product liability.177
On the other hand, drug manufacturers produce goods and place
them in the stream of commerce.' 7  While their products are valuable
to society, the drug manufacturers are profit making enterprises upon
whom product responsibility properly rests. 179 Since drugs, like any
other product, may contain defects that could have been avoided by
better manufacturing or design.' 0 The court in Feldman reasoned
that drug manufacturers should not be treated differently from other
manufacturers.18 ' Moreover, the FDA's determination of safety should
not replace the risk benefit analysis required in the judicial process.812
Although some drugs are more vital to the public health than other
drugs, comment k immunity would treat all drugs the same regardless
of their utility." 3
Finding no justification for giving prescription drug manufacturers
blanket immunity from strict liability for design defect claims, the
173. Kearl v. Lederle Laboratories, 172 Cal. App. 3d 812, 825, 218 Cal. Rptr 453, 459
(1985). See also Feldman v. Lederle Laboratories, 97 N.J. 429, 435, 479 A.2d 374, 380 (1984).
174. 97 N.J. 429, 479 A.2d 374 (1984).
175. Id. at 435, 479 A.2d at 380.
176. Id. at 437, 479 A.2d at 382.
177. Id. at 437, 479 A.2d at 382 (when the essential nature of a transaction involves a
service rather than a product, public policy may dictate that the general welfare is better served
by inapplicability of strict liability doctrine). See also Murphy v. E.R. Squibb & Co., 40 Cal.
3d 672, 677, 710 P.2d 247, 221 Cal. Rptr. 447 (1985) (in providing prescription drugs, a
pharmacy is a service and exempt from strict liability). See CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 4046
(defining a pharmacy as a health service). Carmichael v. Reitz 17 Cal. App. 3d 958, 95 Cal.
Rptr. 381 (1971) (a doctor when prescribing a drug is providing a service and exempt from
strict liability).
178. Feldman v. Lederle Laboratories, 97 N.J. 429, 436, 479 A.2d 374, 383 (1984).
179. Id. See also Collins v. Eli Lilly Co. 116 Wi. 2d 166, 171, 342 N.W.2d 37, 52 (1984)
(drug companies like other manufacturers have a duty to produce and market safe products).
180. Feldman, 97 N.J. at 437, 479 A.2d at 383.
181. Id. at 437, 479 A.2d at 383.
182. Id. at 436, 479 A.2d at 382.
183. Id. 479 A.2d at 436, at 383.
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Feldman court held that the decision whether a drug is unavoidably
unsafe shoud be made on a case-by-case basis. 8 4 The Feldmaii court
then stated that even if a prescription drug were unavoidably unsafe,
the comment k immunity would not eliminate liability for failure to
provide a proper warning. 18 The proper test for a defective warning
is whether the manufacturer knew or should have known of the
danger at the time that the product was distributed. 186 Both actual
and constructive knowledge acquired after distribution of the product,
however, obligates the manufacturer to warn consumers of the newly
discovered danger.1 87 The Feldman court required the manufacturer
to bear the burden of proving that the information was not reasonably
available or obtainable. 88
The Supreme Court of Wisconsin in Collins v. Eli Lilly Co.,189
rejected 402A comment k.' 90 In Collins, the plaintiff sued several
drug manufacturers for injuries to her in utero after her mother
ingested DES. 91 The court stated that drug companies were like other
manufacturers having a duty to produce and market reasonably safe
products. 92 Drug companies can either insure themselves against
liability, absorb the damage award, or pass the cost along to the
consumer as a cost of doing business. 93 The court argued that
imposing liability on drug companies would not affect the availability
of drugs to the public, but would simply encourage drug companies
to produce and market safe drugs. 194
In a recent decision, Toner v. Lederle Laboratories,95 the Idaho
Supreme Court held that comment k was not intended to provide
blanket immunity to all prescription drugs. 196 After receiving a DPT
vaccination, the plaintiff in Toner became paralyzed. 97 Stating that
184. Id.
185. Id. at 439, 479 A.2d at 386 (a manufacturer is deemed to know information available
in the industry or the particular field). See also Wade, supra note 139 at 760 (the court should
determine available scientific knowledge as of the time of distribution).
186. Feldman, 97 N.J. at 439, 479 A.2d at 386.
187. Id. at 437, 479 A.2d at 388.
188. Id.
189. Id. 116 Wis.2d 166, 342 N.W.2d 37 (1984).
190. Id. at 181, 342 N.W.2d at 52 (1984).
191. Id. at 171, 342 N.W.2d at 42.
192. Id. at 181, 342 N.W.2d at 52.
193. Id. at 178, 342 N.W.2d at 49.
194. Id. See also, Page, Generic Product Risks: The Case against Comment k and for
Strict Tort Liability, 54 N.Y.U.L. REv. 856, 884 (1982) (further testing might reveal injurious
side effects of a drug before it reaches the market).
195. 55 U.S.L.W. 2456, 732 P.2d 297 (1987).
196. Toner, at 308.
197. Id. at 298.
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comment k only applies to design defects where no alternative design
is available, the Idaho court held that comment k clearly contemplates
that the benefits of the product should outweigh the risks. 198 Rea-
soning from the language of the commment, the Toner court rejected
the argument that blanket immunity should be granted all prescription
drugs. 199 The Toner court said that obviously not all drugs are so
perfectly designed that they cannot be made purer or safer or that
the benefits of the drugs outweigh their risks. 2°°
PROPOSAL FOR CALIFORNIA COURTS
A. Design Defect
A societal policy encouraging the increased availability of inexpen-
sive, life saving drugs is often in conflict with the policies underlying
strict product liability. To hold manufacturers absolutely liable for
the side effects of drugs could discourage research and marketing of
drugs. 201 On the other hand, holding manufacturers liable only for
negligence would cause many plaintiffs to bear the burden of society's
interest in promoting the availability of prescription drugs.202 As the
court in Brown v. Superior Court23 recognized, the Barker v. Lull
tests provide an effective standard by which to balance the benefits
of a drug against the risks to the consumer. 20 4 Under Barker if the
ordinary consumer would not have taken the drug if the consumer
had known of the risk or if the risks of the drug outweigh the
benefits, the drug is defective. 25 In order to adhere to the policies
198. Id. at 308. See also Willis, The Comment K Character: A Conceptual Barrier to Strict
Liability, 29 MERCER L. Rnv. 545 (1978) (society is not served when an unavoidably unsafe
product with occasional benefit is insulated from strict liability when the product's predominant
effect is harmful to the individual and society).
199. Toner, at 308.
200. Id.
201. See Schwartz, Unavoidably Unsafe Products: Clarifying the Meaning & Policy Behind
Comment K, 42 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1139, 1141 (1985) (society wishes to encourage research
and marketing of new drugs and strict liability would stifle this goal).
202. Collins v. Eli Lilly Co., 34 N.W.2d 37, 49 (Wis. 1984) (It is better to have drug
companies or consumers share the cost of the injury than to place the burden solely on the
innocent plaintiff. Strict liability is particularly important in the case of mass marketed drugs
because consumers and their physicians rely upon advice given by the supplier and consequently
are virtually helpless to protect themselves from serious injuries causd by deleterious drugs).
203. 182 Cal. App. 3d 1125, 227 Cal. Rptr. 768 (1986).
204. Id.
205. Barker v. Lull Eng'g. Co., 20 Cal. 3d 413, 432, 573 P.2d 443, 456, 143 Cal. Rptr.
225, 238 (1978).
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underlying strict products liability doctrine2 6 the California Supreme
Court should hold that prescription drugs may be subject to strict
liability for design defect. 207 Comment k, while providing guidance
in making a decision, should not provide blanket immunity for all
prescription drugs. An unavoidably unsafe product under comment
k is a product that cannot be made safer yet the benefits of the
product outweigh the risks of the product. 20 1 Since different drugs
have different risks and benefits, the determination whether the
benefits outweigh the risks should be made on a case by case basis
at the time of trial.
In Sindell v Abbott Laboratories,209 the first DES case in Califor-
nia, the California Supreme Court stated that the manufacturer is in
the best position to discover and guard against defects in its product
and to warn of injurious side effects. 210 The court stated that these
considerations are particularly significant where medication is in-
volved.211 Consumers cannot protect themselves from serious, some-
times permanent or even fatal injuries caused by dangerous drugs. 212
By testing for design defect at the time of trial, plaintiffs injured
by drugs whose risks outweigh their benefits will be allowed to
recover where the risk is endemic to the drug. However, manufac-
turers who produce drugs whose benefits outweighed their risk will
not be strictly liable under a design theory for the occasional adverse
reaction to a drug.
If the benefits of the drug outweigh the risks and the design is
not defective, the injured party could still proceed under a failure to
warn theory. Comment k immunity does not eliminate strict liability
206. McClelland, supra note 72, at 34 (strict liability is society's mechanism for effecuating
cost-spreading to sellers and a wealth distribution preference in behalf of an injured consumer).
207. See Barker, 20 Cal. 3d at 432, 573 P.2d at 456, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 237.
208. Unavoidably unsafe is a conclusion that the Restatement applies to the rabies vaccine
based upon a balancing of the risks and benefits of the vaccine. REsTATaMENT (SEcoND) OF
TORTS § 402A (1964). Comment k says that many prescription drugs will be unavoidably
unsafe. Comment k does not say that all prescription drugs are unavoidably usafe. Id. Comment
k analysis of the rabies vaccine is similar to the risk benefit analysis of Barker since it, like
Barker focuses on the product. Id.
209. 26 Cal. 3d 588, 607 P.2d 924, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132 (1980).
210. Id. at 611, 607 P.2d at 942, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 150 (1980). See also Collins v. Eli Lilly
Co. 342 N.W. 2d 37, 49 (Wis. 1984). In that case, entirely innocent plaintiffs may have been
severely harmed by a drug that they had no control over. Id. The interests of justice demand
that the defendant who provided the product should bear the cost of injury. Id. Each defendant
contributed to the risk of injury; thus each defendant shares a degree of culpability in
producing and marketing a drug with possibly harmful side effects. Id.
211. Sindell, 26 Cal. 3d 588, 611, 607 P.2d 924, 942, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132, 150.
212. Id.
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for failure to provide a proper warning.213 While the presence of a
warning is one factor in determining whether a design is defective,
21 4
the absence of a warning is also a separate basis of liability.
B. Warning Defects
Strict liability for a failure to warn has often confused California
courts because two questions remain unanswered. The first question
is whether strict liability can be imposed for undiscoverable defects. 2
15
Holding a product liable for not warning of unknowable defects
would make a manufacturer absolutely liable. 2 6 Since absolute lia-
bility for prescription drugs might impede the development of new
drugs, 2 7 manufacturers should be held liable only for known or
knowable defects. The manufacturer, however, should bear the bur-
den of proving that information concerning the defect was not
available or obtainable at the time of distribution. If knowledge of
a defect is acquired subsequently the manufacturer must notify
consumers of the newly discovered defect.
The second question is whether negligence and strict liability tests
are the same in a failure to warn case. A difference exists between
strict liability and negligence depending on the focus of the inquiry.
218
In a warning defect claim, The focus should be on the product itself
not the reasonableness of the conduct of the manufacturer.
The applicability and adequacy of a warning would be judged at
the time of distribution.2 9 In determining the liability for failure to
warn, California courts should apply a Cavers balancing approach
based upon the manufacturer's actual or constructive knowledge at
the time the injury occured. The manufacturer will have the burden
of showing that the manufacturer did not know or could not know
213. Feldman v. Lederle Laboratories, 97 N.J. 429, 436, 479 A.2d 374, 383 (1984).
214. Under both comment k and Barker one of the factors to consider in determining
whether a design is defective is the presence or absence of a warning of the side effect causing
injury. Comment k says that a prescription drug whose benefits outweigh its risks is not
defective or unreasonably dangerous when accompanied by proper directions and warning.
Under Barker, one of the factors to consider in determining whether the benefits outweigh the
risks is the presence of a warning.
215. Finn v. G.D. Searle, 35 Cal.3d 691, 698, 677 P.2d 1147, 1151, 200 Cal. Rptr. 870,
874.
216. But see Schwartz, Understanding Products Liability, 67 CAL. L. Rav. 435, 488 (1979)
(suggesting that strict liability is appropriate for prescription drugs).
217. Id. (manufacturers often know of a defect from an early date).
218. Finn v. G.D. Searle & Co., 35 Cal. 3d 691, 698, 677 P.2d 1147, 1151, 200 Cal. Rptr.
870, 874 (1979).
219. Id. at 701, 677 P.2d at 1153, 200 Cal. Rptr. at 877.
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with the aid of further testing that the drug caused the side effect
producing injury.
Judging a failure to warn case on the basis of actual or constructive
knowledge will protect manufacturers from being insurers of their
drugs. At the same time consumers will be protected because man-
ufacturers will have to show that it was impossible for them to know
of the injurious side effect or to warn of it adequately. In the absence
of legislative guidance, the court should attempt to balance the two
competing societal interests. Society needs life saving drugs and
society needs protection from the injurious side effects caused by
those drugs.
CONCLUSION
Strict products liability has sought to protect injured consumers
who are unable to protect themselves. Courts have attempted to
relieve plaintiffs of their traditional burden of proof under negligence
law by shifting that burden to defendant manufacturers who have
control of the evidentiary material.
In actions against prescription drug manufacturers, however, this
policy of protecting consumers conflicts with the development and
manufacture of life-saving or life-enhancing drugs. These drugs often
have attendant risks. Many courts have chosen to shield prescription
drug manufacturers from strict product liability analysis for design
or warning defects. These courts have argued that the interest of
society as a whole in the development of prescription drugs outweighs
the interest of an injured individual.
This comment has concluded that California courts should reaffirm
their commitment to the principles of strict liability by applying strict
liability for design defects to prescription drugs. At the same time,
society's interest in life saving drugs should be protected by only
requiring manufacturers to be liable for known or knowable defects
in a failure to warn claim.
Rosemary Kelley
220. But see Wildman, Strict Products Liability in California: An Ideological Overview,
19 U.S.F.L. REv 139, 157 (1985) (suggesting that strict liability has created a myth that people
are being taken care of because of a progressive judicial system, yet prevention of injury is
still relegated to unimportant status).
